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“It is better to have a permanent income than to be fascinating.”
- Oscar Wilde, The Model Millionaire: A Note of Admiration
The current US Social Security system provides retirees with a real annuity during their
retirement years.  After a worker’s Primary Insurance Amount has been determined at the point of
retirement, the purchasing power of Social Security benefits remains fixed for the balance of the
individual’s life.  This is accomplished by indexing retirement benefits to annual changes in the
Consumer Price Index (CPI).  Hence retirees are insulated from inflation risk, at least as long as their
consumption bundle is not dissimilar to the bundle used to compute the CPI.
Several current reform plans propose to supplement, or partially replace, the existing defined-
benefit Social Security system with mandatory individual defined contribution accounts (cf. Gramlich,
1996; Mitchell, Myers and Young, 1999; NASI, 1998).  In most “individual account” plans, retirees
would be required to purchase an annuity with all or part of their accumulated account balances.  Yet the
existing market for individual annuities in the United States is small, the expected present value of
annuity payouts is typically below the purchase price of the annuity, and virtually all annuities currently
available offer nominal rather than real payout streams.  This has led some to argue that individual
account plans would expose retirees to inflation risk that they do not currently face, in that they might
purchase nominal annuities with their accumulated funds.
In this paper, we explore four issues concerning real annuities, nominal annuities, and the
inflation risks faced by prospective retirees, all of which are relevant to the prospects for individual
accounts under Social Security reform.  We begin by describing the annuity market in the United
Kingdom.  Annuitants in the U.K. can select from a wide range of both real and nominal annuity
products.  The U.K. annuity market demonstrates the feasibility of offering real annuities in the private
marketplace. Moreover, the current U.K. annuity market may indicate the direction in which the U.S.
annuity market will evolve, since indexed bonds promising a fixed real return to investors have been
available in Britain for nearly two decades. The availability of such bonds has made it possible for U.K.
insurers to offer real annuity products without bearing inflation risk.   Similar bonds have been available2
in the United States for only two years.  Our evaluation of the U.K. annuity market includes an analysis of
the relative prices of both real and nominal annuities, and we present estimates of how much a potential
annuitant must pay to purchase the inflation insurance provided by a real annuity.
Next we turn to the annuity market in the United States and investigate the availability of real
annuities in this country.  In early 1997 the U.S. government introduced Treasury Inflation Protection
Securities (TIPS) and since then, two products that might be described as “inflation indexed annuities”
have come to market.  One, offered by Irish Life Company of North America (ILONA),  promises a
constant purchasing power stream of benefits.  Though this product offers buyers a real stream of annuity
payouts, to date it has not been a commercial success.  The second, offered by TIAA-CREF, is a variable
payout annuity with payouts linked to returns on the CREF Index-Linked Bond Account.  We describe
the operation of the latter account in some detail, and explain why in practice the TIAA-CREF variable
annuity proves not be an inflation-indexed annuity. Hence our analysis of these two products leads us to
conclude that there are no commercially significant real annuities available in the U.S. annuity market at
the present time.
We then go on to consider whether a retiree could use a portfolio of stocks or bonds to hedge
long-term inflation risk, in lieu of a portfolio of indexed bonds.  Specifically, we evaluate how much
inflation risk annuitants would bear if, instead of purchasing nominal annuities, they purchased variable
payout annuities with payouts linked to various asset portfolios. The potential inflation protection
provided by alternative variable payout annuities is assessed using historical correlation patterns between
inflation and nominal returns on stocks, bonds, and bills.
The final portion of the analysis explores the expected utility consequences of annuitizing
retirement resources in alternative ways.  A stylized model is used to calculate the expected lifetime
utility of a retiree who could purchase a nominal annuity (thereby bearing inflation risk), a real annuity,
and a variable-payout equity-linked annuity.  We calibrate this model using available estimates of risk
aversion, mortality risks, and the stochastic structure of real returns on corporate stocks.  Our results
suggest that for plausible values of risk aversion, retirees would not pay very much for the opportunity to3
purchase a real rather than a nominal annuity.  This finding is sensitive, however, to assumptions
regarding the stochastic process for inflation.  Very high expected inflation rates, or very high levels of
inflation variability, can lead to a different conclusion.
We also find that a variable payout annuity, with payouts linked to the returns on a portfolio of
common stocks, is more attractive than a real annuity for consumers with modest risk aversion.  This
result rests on assumptions about the expected return on stocks relative to riskless assets and hence must
be viewed with some caution, since there is substantial prospective uncertainty about expected stock
returns.  The finding nevertheless illustrates the potentially important role of variable payout annuities as
devices for annuitizing assets from individual accounts.
The paper is divided into five sections.  Section one presents findings on the real and nominal
annuity markets in the United Kingdom; the next section describes two “inflation linked annuities”
offered in the United States.  Section three reports findings on the correlation between unexpected
inflation and real returns on various financial assets and summarizes previous research on this
relationship.  This section also presents evidence on the ex post real payout streams that would have been
paid to retirees had they purchased variable payout annuities at different dates over the last seventy years.
The fourth section outlines our algorithm for evaluating the utility benefits of access to various types of
annuity products.  We report on the “wealth equivalent” of different annuitization options and link this
work with the rapidly growing literature on lifetime portfolio allocation in the presence of financial
market and inflation risk.  In a brief concluding section we sketch directions for future work.
1. The Market for Real Annuities in the United Kingdom
We begin our analysis by describing the real annuity market in the United Kingdom, since these
annuities provide important evidence on both the feasibility of providing real annuities through private
insurers as well as the consumer costs of buying inflation insurance.  We then calculate the expected
present discounted value of payouts on real and nominal annuities currently available in the U.K.4
1.1  The Current Structure of the U.K. Annuity Market
Annuities providing a constant real payout stream are widely available in the United Kingdom.
This is partly due to the fact that government-issued indexed bonds have been available in the U.K. for
nearly two decades.  Insurance companies holding these bonds can hedge the price level risk that is
associated with offering annuity payouts denominated in real rather than in nominal terms.  Blake (1999)
reports that insurers offering nominal annuities typically back them by holding nominal government
bonds, while those offering real annuities hold indexed bonds.
The two segments of the individual annuity market in the United Kingdom are defined according
to where funds used to purchase the annuity are accumulated.  One market segment involves annuities
purchased with tax-qualified retirement funds, while the other segment is focused on annuities purchased
outside such plans.  Qualified retirement plans in Britain include defined benefit occupational pension
schemes  and “personal pension plans” (PPPs).  Most occupational plans are defined benefit plans, and
the annuities that are paid out to their beneficiaries are not purchased in the individual annuity market.
PPPs, available since 1988, are retirement saving plans that are broadly similar to Individual Retirement
Accounts in the United States.  (Prior to 1988, a similar type of plan was available to self-employed
individuals.)  Contributions to PPPs are tax-deductible, and income on the assets held in such plans is not
taxed until the funds are withdrawn.    Budd and Campbell (1998) report that in the early 1990s, roughly
one quarter of U.K. workers participated in a personal pension plan.  Personal pension plans are likely to
account for most of the purchases of qualified annuities, since defined contribution plans constitute a
minority of U.K. occupational pensions.
Those who reach retirement age with assets in a defined contribution occupational pension, or
with assets in a personal pension plan, are legally required to annuitize at least part of their pension
accumulations.  For this reason, the U.K. market for annuities purchased with funds from qualified
pension plans is known as the “compulsory annuity market.”  In recent years there has been some
relaxation of the rules requiring annuitization.  Currently, a retiree can withdraw up to one quarter of a5
personal pension plan accumulation as a lump sum distribution, and assets can be held in the PPP up to
age 75 before they must be annuitized.
The U.K. annuity arena is also characterized by a second group of voluntarily purchased
annuities, known as the "noncompulsory” market.  In this second market segment, funds accumulated
outside of qualified retirement plans are used to purchase annuity products.
As other analysts of the individual annuity market have emphasized, demographic characteristics
and mortality prospects of annuity buyers in the compulsory and non-compulsory markets are likely to
differ.  The set of people that purchases annuities in a voluntary purchase market is likely to have better
mortality prospects (i.e. a longer life expectancy) as compared to randomly selected individuals in the
population.  For this reason, workers with PPPs or covered by defined contribution occupational plans are
probably not a random subset of the population; their longevity prospects are likely to be better than those
of the population at large.  Finkelstein and Poterba (1999) compare the U.K. compulsory and non-
compulsory annuity markets and show that payouts as a fraction of premiums are somewhat lower in the
non-compulsory market.  But the extent of adverse selection among annuitants receiving employer
pensions is anticipated to be smaller than among people buying individual annuities outside a retirement
plan.  Our analysis focuses on annuities offered in the “compulsory annuity” marketplace.
The compulsory annuitization requirement for Personal Pension Plans has created a substantial
group of retirement-age individuals in the U.K. who must purchase an annuity.  To service their needs,
“annuity brokers” exist to help retirees obtain quotes on annuity products.  We contacted several of these
brokers for data on UK annuity prices and the terms of annuity contracts.  Though we have not
established precisely how much of the annuity market our sample firms cover, it does appear that we have
identified most of the major annuity providers.
To focus the discussion we restrict our attention to nominal and inflation-linked single life
annuity products.  Here the term nominal is used to refer to values denominated in current pounds (or
dollars), while real refers to inflation-corrected pounds or dollars.  The analysis was conducted using nine
insurance companies offering Retail Price Index (RPI)-linked single life annuity policies, and fourteen6
companies offering nominal single-life products.   (By comparison, there are nearly one hundred
insurance companies offering individual annuity products in the United States, according to A.M. Best’s
surveys.)   We do not consider “graded” nominal annuity policies that offer a rising stream of nominal
benefits over the life of the annuitant at a pre-specified nominal escalation rate.  Graded annuities provide
annuitants with a way of backloading the real value of payouts from their annuities, but they do not insure
against inflation fluctuations as real annuities do.  We focus our attention on policies that were available
in late August, 1998, and we consider annuities with a £100,000 purchase price (premium).
Table 1 reports mean monthly payouts for both nominal and RPI-linked annuities for the firms in
our sample.  The first two columns show the sample average payout for each type of annuity.  They
indicate that the first-month payout on a real annuity is between 25 and 30 percent lower than the first-
month payout on a nominal annuity.  This reduction in initial benefits is sometimes cited as the reason
some consumers shy away from indexed annuities.  The data also indicate differences in the ratio of
nominal to real annuity payouts across age groups (real annuities are priced more favorably with rising
age), and between men and women (real annuities are priced more favorably for men).  These presumably
reflect mortality-related differences in the expected duration of payouts under different annuity contracts.
We also see substantial variation in the annuity benefits paid by the different insurers, as was
previously found for the U.S. annuity market (Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky, and Brown, hereafter
MPWB; 1999).  The third and fourth columns of Table 1 report the coefficient of variation for monthly
annuity payouts in both markets; here we see that the pricing of indexed annuities varies more than that of
nominal annuities.  For five of the six “products” defined by age and gender of buyer, the coefficient of
variation is greater for the real than for the nominal annuity.  This may be due to the fact that the effective
duration of a real annuity is longer than that of a nominal annuity, so that the insurer’s cost of providing a
real annuity is more sensitive to future developments in mortality patterns.  Explaining the observed price
dispersion in annuity markets is an important task for future research.7
1.2  Evaluating the “Money’s Worth” of Nominal and Real Annuities
To evaluate the administrative and other costs associated with the individual annuities offered in
the U.K. market, we compute the expected present discounted value (EPDV) of payouts for the average
nominal and the average index-linked annuity.  We compare this EPDV with the premium cost of the
annuity to obtain a measure of the “money’s worth” of the individual annuity.  Similar measures are
available for annuities offered in the United States; Warshawsky (1988) reports calculations for the period
from 1920 to the early 1980s,  MPWB (1999) examine data through 1995, and Poterba and Warshawsky
(1998) offer results for mid-1998.
The formula used to calculate the EPDV of a nominal annuity with a monthly payout An,
purchased by an individual of age b, is:
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We assume that no annuity buyer lives beyond age 115 and we truncate the annuity calculation after
12*(115-b) months.  Pj denotes the probability that an individual of age b years at the time of the annuity
purchase survives for at least j months after buying the annuity.  The variable ik denotes the one-month
nominal interest rate k months after the annuity purchase.
For a real annuity, this expression must be modified to recognize that the amount of the payout is
time-varying in nominal terms but fixed in real terms.  The easiest way to handle this is to allow Ar to
denote the real monthly payout, and to replace the nominal interest rates in the denominator of (1) with
corresponding real interest rates.  We use rk to denote the one-month real interest rate k months after the
annuity purchase.  Such real interest rates can be constructed from the UK yield curve for index-linked
Treasury securities.  The expression that we evaluate to compute the EPDV of a real annuity is:
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We evaluate (1) and (2) using U.K. population projected survival probabilities compiled by H.M.
Treasury.  We use cohort mortality tables for those who reached age 60, 65, or 70 in 1998.  We were not8
able to obtain mortality tables corresponding to the annuitant population.  By using population mortality
tables, we are in effect asking what the EPDV of the average annuity would be when viewed from the
perspective of an average individual in the population.  Of course, the average annuity buyer and the
average person in the population may be different, to the extent that annuitants have longer life
expectancies.  Since a real annuity offers larger payouts near the end of life than a nominal annuity does,
using a population rather than an annuitant mortality table overstates the effective cost of purchasing an
inflation-indexed annuity relative to a nominal annuity.
Table 2 reports EPDV calculations for single life annuities for men and women of different ages
in the compulsory U.K. annuity marketplace.  Results for the average annuity payout are given as a
simple average across the firms in our sample; we also provide the EPDV using average payouts for the
three highest and three lowest annuity payout firms in our sample.  The results show that the cost of
buying an inflation-protected annuity in the United Kingdom is about five percent of the annuity
premium.  Also, the EPDV of a nominal annuity contract purchased in conjunction with a qualified
retirement saving plan is five percent higher than that for a real annuity. While the EPDV for nominal
annuities is approximately 90 percent of the premium cost, the analogous EPDV for real annuities
averages roughly 85 percent.  This difference in EPDVs might explain Diamond’s (1997) claim that most
annuitants in the United Kingdom elect nominal rather than real annuities.
Some of the apparent “cost” of inflation protection may arise from adverse selection across the
various types of annuities.  That is, if annuitants who anticipate that they will live much longer than the
average annuitant tend to purchase real annuities, then mortality rates for those who buy real annuities
may be lower than those for nominal annuity buyers.  Whether such mortality differences actually explain
the payout differences between nominal and real annuities is not yet known.
These estimates of the U.K. expected present discounted value of nominal annuity payouts are
somewhat higher than our estimates of EPDV for U.S. nominal annuity products around roughly the same
date.  For example, in 1998, the average EPDV on U.S. nominal annuity contracts available to 65-year-
old men (using the population mortality table) was 84 percent for annuities purchased through qualified9
retirement saving plans (Poterba and Warshawsky, 1998).  The lower U.S. payout may reflect cross-
country differences in the degree of mortality selection, relative to the population as a whole, in the
“qualified” (U.S.) and “compulsory” (U.K.) annuity markets.
Table 2 also suggests that there are systematic patterns in the money’s worth values across age
groups for both nominal and real annuities in the U.K. market.  The EPDV declines as a function of the
annuitant’s age at the time the annuity is purchased.   An explanation for this pattern may be that those
who retire later tend to have lower mortality rates than those who retire earlier.  Age at retirement and age
at annuity purchase may be linked more closely in the market for compulsory retirement annuities than in
the market for non-compulsory annuities.   We suspect that many compulsory annuity buyers purchase
their annuities when they retire, even though current U.K. rules do not require such purchases.
The results in Table 2 also suggest that for a retiree of given age/sex characteristics there is
frequently a ten percent difference between the average annuity payout for the firms offering the highest
payout annuities and the firms offering the lowest payouts.  Such dispersion is consistent with earlier
evidence suggesting substantial pricing differences in the U.S. market for nominal annuities (MPWB,
1999).  This raises the question of how potential annuitants choose among the various annuity products.
In the U.S. case, there is little evidence of strong correlation between factors such as the credit rating of
the insurance company offering the annuity and the EPDV paid out (MPWB, 1999).
In sum, one lesson from the widespread availability of index-linked annuities the U.K. annuity
market is that it is possible for private insurers to develop and offer real annuity products.   This is surely
easier in a nation with a well-developed market for index-linked bonds.  A second lesson is that, based on
nominal and real annuity pricing, the costs of obtaining inflation insurance are less than five percent of
the purchase price of a nominal annuity.
2.  Real Annuities in the United States: TIAA-CREF and ILONA
The U.S. individual annuity market differs from that in the U.K. in that virtually all annuity
products are nominal annuities.  Individuals can purchase a variety of products with a graded payout10
structure, so that the nominal value of their payouts (and, for low enough inflation rates, the real value of
payouts) is expected to rise over time. There are only two annuity products that we are aware of that
promise some degree of inflation protection.  The first is the “Freedom CPI Indexed Income Annuity,”
offered by the Irish Life Company of North America (ILONA), and the second is the “Inflation Linked
Bond Account” annuity, offered by TIAA-CREF.  In this section we describe how these products work,
their current prices and payouts, and the degree to which they provide inflation protection for annuity
buyers. We also note that since Treasury Inflation Protection Securities (TIPS) were introduced to the
U.S. market only recently, additional insurers may offer real annuities as familiarity with these new assets
grows.  Insurance companies can hedge the inflation risk associated with these price level indexed annuity
products by purchasing TIPS bonds.
2.1  The ILONA Real Annuity
Irish Life PLC, an international insurance firm headquartered in Dublin, Ireland, offers index-
linked annuities in the United States through the Interstate Assurance Company, which is a division of
Irish Life of North America (ILONA).  Interstate is a well-regarded company: it had assets of $1.3 billion
and it received a AA rating from Duff and Phelps, an A rating from A.M. Best and Company, and a AA-
rating from Standard and Poors in 1996. The indexed annuity product from ILONA is the “Freedom CPI
Indexed Income Annuity.”   The annuity payout rises annually in step with the increase in the prior year’s
CPI.  Annuity benefits from the Freedom CPI Indexed Income Annuity are guaranteed to never decline in
nominal terms, even if the CPI were to fall from year to year.  The minimum purchase requirement for the
ILONA annuity product is $10,000, and the maximum purchase is $1 million.  The annuity is available to
individuals between the ages of 65 and 85.  There are various payout options, including simple life
annuities, annuities that provide a fixed numbers of years of payouts for certain, and “refund annuities.”
These annuity products are available both as individual and as joint and survivor annuities.  Although
ILONA offers this real annuity product in the US, the agent whom we contacted indicated that thus far no
sales of these annuities have been recorded.11
Data were obtained on the monthly payouts offered by ILONA’s indexed and nominal single
premium immediate annuities for men and women age 65, 70, and 75, assuming a premium of $1 million
in each case.  We also obtained data on joint-and-survivor annuities with 100 percent survivor benefits.
Policies purchased in mid-1998 offered a monthly payout on a real annuity at the start of the annuity
contract about 30 percent smaller than the payout on a nominal annuity issued to the same individual.
Table 3 shows that for men at age 65, the ratio of real to nominal payouts is 69 percent.  For women at 65,
the ratio is 66 percent, potentially reflecting the longer life expectancy and therefore greater back-loading
that occurs with a real rather than a nominal annuity for women rather than for men.
To determine the payouts relative to premium cost for these annuities, we again calculate the
EPDV of annuity payouts for each of the ILONA policies quoted using a procedure similar to that
described above. (Interest and mortality rates differ somewhat relative to the U.K. calculations).  For
discount factors in our EPDV calculations, we use the nominal yield curve for zero-coupon U.S. Treasury
bonds.  We start from the term structure of yields for zero-coupon Treasury “strips,” and work out the
pattern of monthly interest rates implied by these yields under the simple expectations theory of the term
structure.  Data on the zero-coupon yield curve are published each Thursday in the Wall Street Journal,
and we use information from the beginning of June 1998.  Because we do not know the precise date at
which ILONA offered the annuities we are pricing, and in light of the absence of transactions in this
annuity market, we select the June 1998 term structure as an approximate guide to discount rates in mid-
1998.  When evaluating the EPDV of the ILONA real annuity, we use the implied short-term real interest
rates that can be derived from the term structure of real interest rates of Treasury Inflation Protection
Securities; once again we use these rates from early June 1998.
With regard to survival patterns, we have access to two distinct mortality tables for the U.S.  The
first, developed by the Social Security Administration’s Office of the Actuary and reported in Bell, Wade,
and Goss (1992), applies to the entire population.  We update this mortality table to reflect the prospective
mortality rates of a 65-year old (or 70- or 75-year old) purchasing an annuity in 1998.  For example, in
estimating the money’s worth of an annuity for a 65 year old in 1998, we use the projected mortality12
experience of the 1933 birth cohort. A second set of projected mortality rates corresponds to that relevant
to current annuitants.  MPWB (1999) develop an algorithm that combines information from the Annuity
2000 mortality table, described in Johansen (1996), the older 1983 Individual Annuitant Mortality table,
and the projected rate of mortality improvement implicit in the difference between the Social Security
Administration’s cohort and period mortality tables for the population.  This algorithm generates
projected mortality rates for the set of annuitants purchasing annuity contracts in a given year.  It is worth
noting that the population and annuitant mortality rates differ.  For instance, the 1995 annual mortality
rate for annuitants age 65-75 was roughly half that for the general population (MPWB 1999).  This
mortality differential generates a substantially larger EPDV of annuity payouts using the annuitant versus
the population mortality table.
Table 4 reports EPDV calculations for Irish Life real and nominal annuities. (All EPDV
calculations use pretax annuity payouts and before-tax interest rates.  MPWB (1999) show that pre-tax
and post-tax EPDV calculations for U.S. nominal annuities yield similar results.).  For nominal annuities
and using the population mortality table, the expected present discounted value of payouts for men is
approximately 85 cents per premium dollar and 89 cents for women.  These values are slightly higher
than the average EPDV values based on nominal annuities described in A.M. Best’s annuity survey of
June 1998 (Poterba and Warshawsky, 1998).  Using the annuitant mortality table for nominal annuities,
the EPDV proves to be worth a much larger share of premium value, approximately 98 cents per dollar
for men and 97 cents for women.
We next turn to EPDV results for the ILONA real annuity computed using the real interest rates
implicit in the TIPS yield curve, and we see that the value per dollar of premium is much lower than for
the nominal annuity.  For instance, a 65-year-old man purchasing a real annuity would expect an EPDV
of 70 percent, versus 86 percent for the nominal annuity.   At other ages a similar pattern applies: the
money’s worth for the real annuity products is typically 15-20 percent lower than that for nominal
annuities.   The fact that inflation protection adds more than 15 percent to the annuity’s cost may explain
the limited demand for this product in the U.S.13
2.2  Annuities Linked to the CREF Index-Linked Bond Account (ILBA)
In May of 1997 the College Equities Retirement Fund (CREF) launched a new investment
account, one that was intended to appeal to those who are saving for retirement as well as to retirees
receiving annuity payouts.  This product, called the CREF Inflation-Linked Bond Account (ILBA),
followed from the federal government’s decision to issue TIPS on January 29, 1997.  TIAA-CREF
indicated that its new inflation-linked account was expected to be useful for providing participants with
“another investment option that can enhance portfolio diversification and mitigate the long-term impact of
inflation on their retirement accumulations and benefits” (TIAA-CREF 1997a).  The fund’s goal was
described as seeking “a long-term rate of return that outpaces inflation, through a portfolio of inflation-
indexed bonds and other securities” (TIAA-CREF 1997b).
The CREF Inflation-Linked Bond Account has grown slowly since its inception.  At the end of
September 1998, the account had attracted investments of only $131 million, making it the smallest of all
the retirement funds offered by TIAA-CREF.  To place this amount in context, on the same date the
CREF Stock fund held $96.9 billion (75 times as much as the ILBA), the TIAA Traditional Annuity fund
held $94.3 billion, and all other TIAA-CREF retirement funds combined held about $25 billion.  Most of
the funds held in the ILBA are in the accounts of TIAA-CREF active participants, rather than retirees, and
as such they are still accumulating rather than drawing down assets.
To describe the inflation protection that an annuity linked to the CREF ILBA provides, we need
to provide some background both on the structure of this account, on the basic structure of variable
annuity products, and on the specific operation of the CREF variable annuity.
The CREF Index-Linked Bond Account  The ILBA “invests mainly in inflation-indexed bonds
issued or guaranteed by the US government, or its agencies and instrumentalities, and in other inflation-
indexed securities” with foreign securities capped at 25% of the assets (TIAA-CREF 1998a).   At present
the ILBA holds 98 percent of its assets in U.S. government inflation-linked securities and 2 percent short-
term investments maturing in less than one year.  In principle, the fund’s asset allocation could become
broader in the future, with corporate inflation-indexed securities and those issued by foreign governments14
potentially being included as well as money market instruments.  Expenses total 31 basis points annually
which is probably explained by the small size of the fund and the fact that it is a new account.  This
expense ratio is lower than many mutual and pension fund expense levels, but it is as high as other, more
actively managed CREF accounts such as the Stock Account (31 basis points) and the Bond Market
Account (29 basis points) (see www.tiaa-cref.org/expenses.html).
The ILBA has no sales, surrender, or premium charges. Participants may elect this account as one
of several investment vehicles into which new retirement contributions may be made, and/or into which
existing assets from other TIAA-CREF accounts may be transferred.  As with other CREF accounts, the
participant is limited to one transfer per business day in or out of the account during the accumulation
phase.  The ILBA may used as a vehicle for accumulating retirement assets, or it can be used to back the
payment stream for a variable payout annuity.  Most of our interest focuses on the second function.
The ILBA account is marked to market daily, meaning that asset values fluctuate and the account
could lose money.  For example, if real interest rates rose due to a decline in expected inflation, bond
prices could fall.  As the Fund Prospectus points out, in such an event the inflation-linked bond fund’s
“total return would then not actually track inflation every year” (TIAA-CREF 1998b).  This is a key
feature of the ILBA, and it means that the account does not effectively offer a real payout stream to
annuitants who purchase variable payout annuities tied to the ILBA.
Real interest rate changes are not the only source of variation in ILBA returns.  If the principal
value of inflation-linked bonds changes in response to inflation shocks, perhaps because investors infer
something about the future of real interest rates from inflation news, this would also affect the returns on
the ILBA.  Similarly, changes in the definition of the CPI might affect the ILBA return.
The ILBA return for 1998 were 3.48 percent.  This made it the lowest earning fund of all the tax-
qualified accounts offered by TIAA-CREF in 1998, as Table 5 illustrates.  Daily returns on the ILBA can
sometimes be negative.
Variable Annuities: General Structure  An annuity with payouts that rise and fall with the value of
the CREF ILBA fund is a special case of a variable payout annuity.  The key distinction between a fixed15
annuity (including a graded fixed annuity with a pre-specified set of changing nominal payouts over time)
and a variable annuity is that the payouts on a variable annuity cannot be specified for certain at the
beginning of the payout period.  Rather, a variable annuity is defined by an initial payout amount, which
we shall denote A(0), and an “updating rule” that relates the annuity payout in future periods to the
previous payout and the intervening returns on the portfolio that backs the variable annuity.
To determine the initial nominal payout on a single-life variable annuity, per dollar of annuity
purchase, the insurance company solves an equation like
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where R is the variable annuity’s “Assumed Interest Rate” or the “Annuity Valuation Rate” as in Bodie
and Pesando (1983).  T is the maximum potential lifespan of the annuitant.  This expression would
require modification if there were a guarantee of some number of certain payments or some other
additional structure imposed on the annuity payouts.  This expression ignores expenses and other
administrative costs associated with the sales of annuities or the operation of insurance companies.
The annuity updating rule depends on the return on the assets that back the annuity, which we
denote by zt, according to:
(4) A(t+1) =  A(t)*(1+zt)/(1+R).
The frequency at which payouts are updated varies across annuity products, and there is no requirement
that the payout be updated every time it is paid.  (Thus, one might have an annuity with monthly payouts
but quarterly updating.)
In designing a variable annuity, the assumed interest rate (R) is a key parameter.  Assuming a
high value of R will enable the insurance company to offer a large initial premium, but, for any
underlying portfolio, the stream of future payouts will be more likely to decline as the assumed value of R
rises.  Equation (4) clearly indicates that an individual who purchases a variable annuity will receive
payouts that fluctuate with the nominal value of the underlying portfolio.16
Specific Provisions of the CREF ILBA-Backed Annuity.  When a TIAA-CREF participant
terminates employment, he or she can begin receiving retirement benefits.  The participant then decides
how to manage the payouts from accumulated retirement accounts.  This includes deciding whether to
annuitize the retirement assets, how much to annuitize, and whether to use an inflation-linked annuity,
subject to the proviso that individual employers may restrict retirees’ options.  Benefits are payable
monthly, though recipients may elect quarterly, semi-annual, and annual payouts as an alternative (TIAA-
CREF 1998d).
  In addition, the participant can chose the form and duration of the payout pattern, subject
to minimum distribution rules set by the IRS.  If the participant chooses to annuitize part of his or her
accumulation, there are a variety of potential annuity structures, including life annuities, 10- and 20-year
certain payout annuities, and joint and survivor as well as single life products.
Under TIAA-CREF rules, a CREF participant electing an annuity must be no older than age 90
when he or she initially applies for the annuity.  The applicant must select at least one of the annuity
accounts initially for the drawdown phase, and thereafter, he or she may switch from one annuity account
into another as often as once per quarter (TIAA-CREF 1998a).  There are restrictions on shifting funds
from TIAA to CREF: this must take place over a longer horizon.  While the choice of annuity fund can be
altered, the form of benefit payout cannot be changed once the annuity has been issued.
In order to understand how CREF annuity payments are determined, it is necessary to define the
“basic” annuity unit value.  This is an amount set each March 31 by dividing an account’s total funds in
payment status by the actuarial present value of the future annuity benefits to be paid out, assuming a 4
percent nominal interest rate and mortality patterns characteristics of existing CREF annuitants.  A unisex
version of the mortality table for individual annuitants is used when the applicant first files for an annuity
“set back for each complete year elapsed since 1986” (TIAA-CREF (1998d)). The same mortality table is
applied to all TIAA-CREF annuity accounts, based on participant mortality experience.  Mortality
experience is adjusted every quarter.
A newly retired participant seeking to annuitize his retirement sum must have his own
accumulation amount translated into an initial annuity amount (A(0)), determined by dividing his17
accumulation by the product of an annuity factor and the basic annuity unit value just described.  The
annuity factor reflects assumed survival probabilities based on the annuitant’s age and an assumed
effective Annual Interest Rate (AIR) of 4 percent nominal (TIAA-CREF 1998c).
The participant’s initial annuity amount is then adjusted over the life of the annuity contract on
either a monthly or an annual basis, depending on the participant’s election.  The adjustment will reflect
the actual fund earnings on a ‘total return’ basis, relative to the assumed 4 percent AIR.  Actual
investment performance is used to update the annuity values as of May 1 for those electing to have their
income change annually, or monthly for those electing monthly income changes.  Because the investment
returns on the underlying accounts affect annuity payouts, these TIAA-CREF annuities are variable
payout annuities.
The Extent of Inflation Protection.  It is evident that a variable payout annuity linked to the
CREF-ILBA does not provide a guaranteed inflation product, since it is marked to market daily.  Thus if
the price drops, or if the unit value failed to rise with inflation, the participant’s unit value would not be
constant in real terms.  More importantly, the CREF annuity may fail to keep up with inflation because of
the way in which it is designed.  When the first-year annuity payout is set, it assumes the 4 percent AIR
mentioned above, which is the same rate used for other CREF annuities.  In subsequent years, if the unit
value of the account were to rise less than 4 percent, payouts would be reduced to reflect this lower
valuation.  For example, the total return (after expenses) on the ILBA account for 1998 was 3.48 percent.
Since the AIR for the CREF annuity is 4 percent, an annuity in its second or later year payout phase
would experience a decline in payout of 0.52 percent.
This adjustment to future payout levels does not necessarily correspond to the CPI inflation rate
in 1998.  In our example, if the annual inflation rate for 1998 were anything greater than one percent, the
real value of annuity payouts for those holding ILBA-backed variable annuities would decline in 1999
and subsequent years.  The only way a second or subsequent-year payout could be guaranteed not to
decline in real terms would be if the real return on the account, i.e. on Treasury Inflation Protection
Securities, always exceeded 4 percent.  It does not at present.18
The precise extent to which payouts on ILBA-backed variable annuities will vary in real terms in
the future is an open question.  If the prices of inflation-linked bonds are bid up during high-inflation
periods, and real interest rates decline at such times, this will partly protect the ILBA account value.  One
relevant comparison for potential annuitants, however, may be between holding a CREF ILBA-backed
variable annuity, and purchasing TIPS bonds directly.  Two considerations are relevant to such a
comparison.  First, the TIPS bonds offer a more direct form of inflation protection, although they do not
provide any risk-sharing with respect to mortality risk.  Second, there are tax differences between the two
investment strategies.  TIPS would be taxable if they were not held in a qualified pension account, while
the income from bonds held in the CREF ILBA-backed account is not taxed until the proceeds are
withdrawn.
The CREF variable payout annuity linked to the ILBA would be more likely to deliver a future
real payout stream if the AIR on this annuity were set equal to the real interest rate on long-term TIPS at
the time when the annuity is purchased.  In this case, the return on the bond portfolio would typically
equal the AIR plus the annual inflation rate, leaving aside some of the risks of holding indexed bonds
such as changes in the way the CPI is constructed.  This would provide a mechanism for delivering
something closer to a real annuity payout stream.  One difficulty with this approach is that it would make
it more difficult for annuitants to take advantage of some of the investment flexibilities currently provided
by CREF.  At present, all CREF annuities assume the same AIR, regardless of the assets that back them.
This facilitates conversions from one annuity type to another.
To date, there has been very limited demand for CREF’s ILBA-backed variable payout annuities.
This lack of demand raises the perennial question of why retirees are not more concerned about inflation
protection.  One reason often given is “inflation illusion”; that is, people simply do not understand how
inflation erodes purchasing power.  Another reason may be that inflation-proof assets are new so that
investors have not yet learned how to think about such assets.  Hammond (1998) notes that inflation-
linked bonds in other countries took some time to become popular after they were introduced: “After a
flurry of initial interest, inflation bonds in those countries went through a period of quiescence -- low19
liquidity and little interest.  Then, with some sort of trigger – renewed inflation or a strong commitment
on the part of central government – the market picked up and people began to figure out what the bonds
were good for.  In the U.K. this process took about ten years.”  The United States today may be in the
early stages of this process.
2.3  Conclusions About Real Annuities in the United States
Our analysis of the ILONA and TIAA-CREF experience suggests that there is currently no
market for genuine real annuities in the United States.  While ILONA offers a product that guarantees a
real stream of payouts, no one has yet purchased this annuity. This may reflect the fact that the
instrument’s pricing requires relatively high rates of inflation to generate benefits with expected present
discounted values similar to those of nominal annuities offered by ILONA and other insurers.  The
inflation-linked bond account offered by CREF has attracted investment funds since it became available
in 1997, but the CREF variable annuities with payouts linked to returns on inflation indexed bonds does
not guarantee its buyers a constant real payout stream.  Although in practice it may come close to
delivering a constant real payout, its performance will depend on the as yet uncertain price movements in
the prices of Treasury Inflation Protecton Securities.
3. Asset Returns and Inflation: Another Route to Inflation Insurance
The last two sections focused on insurance contracts that explicitly provide a constant real income
stream for retirees.  In this section we consider the possibility of using variable payout annuities linked to
assets other than indexed bonds as an alternative means of avoiding inflation risk.  Such variable payout
annuities can reduce the impact of inflation in two ways.  First, they may offer higher average returns than
the assets that are used in pricing real and nominal annuities.  These returns may, of course, come at the
price of greater payout variability.   Second, it is possible that the returns on the assets that underlie the
variable payout annuities may move in tandem with inflation.  In this case a variable payout annuity could
provide a form of inflation insurance.20
To examine these arguments, we begin by summarizing the well-known historical real return
performance of U.S. stocks, bonds, and Treasury bill investments.  We do this by considering an
individual who considers investing one dollar in cash, or in a portfolio of Treasury bills, long-term bonds,
or corporate stock.  We calculate the real value of an initial $1 investment after 5, 10, 20, and 30 years.
We first perform this calculation in 1926, so that the 30-year return interval concludes in 1955.  We then
repeat the calculation in 1927, 1928, and all subsequent years in which we have enough data to calculate
long-term returns.  The last year for which we have return information is 1997, so we finish our five year
calculations in 1993, our ten year calculations in 1988, and so on.
To summarize the results on the real value of each investment, we calculate both the average real
value of each investment, averaged across all of the years with sufficient data.  We also compute the
standard deviation of this real return.  The results of these calculations appear in Table 6.   The underlying
calculations have been done using actual returns on stocks, bills and, bonds over the 1926-1997 period.
For the return after five (30) years, there are 66 (41) overlapping return intervals.  The results in Table 6
show that holding cash worth $1 initially would have an average real value of only 49 cents after 20 years
on average.  In contrast, a $1 initial investment in bills or bonds would have increased in real value.  For
bills, the cumulative real return over 20 years was 1.3 percent, while for bonds, it was 16.1 percent.  The
last column of Table 6 shows comparable calculations for corporate stock.  Here the real value of the
investment after 20 years would have increased by a factor of 4.5.  This implies that an investor who
purchased an income stream tied to the total return on the U.S. stock market, such as an equity-linked
variable annuity, would have the potential to receive a higher real income stream late in retirement than at
the beginning of retirement.  This stands in stark contrast to the declining real value of the payouts on a
fixed nominal stream, such as a nominal annuity contract.
The substantial real return on U.S. equities suggests that one method of obtaining partial long-
term protection against inflationary erosion of annuity payouts might be to purchase a portfolio of
equities, and then to link annuity payouts to equity returns.  In practice, however, variable annuity policies
that offer payouts linked to equity returns do not guarantee real payouts that rise as steeply as Table 621
suggests.  This is because the payouts on a variable annuity depend on the performance of the underlying
assets relative to the Assumed Interest Rate (AIR) on the annuity product (R in equation (3)) as Bodie and
Pesando (1983) explain in detail.  Therefore the variable annuity payout for an equity-linked variable
annuity can only rise over time if the equity portfolio returns more than the assumed value of R used in
designing the annuity. Bodie and Pesando (1983) assume that R equals the historical average return on the
assets that back the annuity, but in practice we have found that nominal R values of 3 or 4 percent per
year are common in the current variable payout annuity market.  This is true even for equity-backed
annuities.  One should note that if a variable payout annuity assumed R = 0, then the real payouts in Table
6 would in fact describe the experience of an annuitant, since the nominal payout recursion would become
A(t+1) =  A(t)*(1+zt).
The high average real return on equities implies that an investor holding U.S. stocks over the last
seven decades would have experienced a rising real wealth profile.  But to study whether this is because
equities provide a good inflation hedge, we must explore the way U.S. equity returns covary with shocks
to the inflation rate.  If stocks generate positive returns when the inflation rate rises unexpectedly, then
equities operate as an inflation hedge.  The fact that U.S. equities have generated substantial positive
returns over the period since 1926 does not provide any information on the correlation between inflation
and stock returns.
We investigate the historical covariances between real U.S. stock returns, bond returns, and bill
returns, and unexpected inflation shocks, over the 1926-1997, and 1947-1997, periods.  If the real return
on a particular asset category is not affected by unexpected inflation, then that asset can serve as a
valuable inflation hedge.  If the real return on the asset declines when inflation rises unexpectedly,
however, then that asset does not provide an inflation hedge.
The first step in our analysis involves estimating of a time series for “unexpected inflation.”  We
do this by estimating fourth-order autoregessive models relating annual inflation (pt) to its own lagged
values, or to its own lagged values as well as those of nominal Treasury bill rates (it).  The basic
regression specification is either22
(5a) pt  = r0 + r 1*pt-1 + r2*pt-2 + r3*pt-3 + r4*pt-4  + f1*it-1   + f2*it-2  + f3*it-3  +  f4*it-4  + eit
or
(5b)  pt  = r0 + r 1*pt-1 + r2*pt-2 + r3*pt-3 + r4*pt-4  + eit    .
We estimate each model for the 1926-1997 period and the 1947-1997 period.
Table 7 presents the findings from estimating (5a) and (5b).   Two broad conclusions emerge
from the table.  First, there is a great deal of persistence in inflation.  The sum of the four coefficients on
lagged inflation for the 1926-1997 period is .773, while for the 1947-1997 period it is .732.  There is
somewhat greater inflation persistence in the early years of the sample than in the post-war period.   We
experimented with extending the length of the lag polynomial in (5a) and (5b).  While the fourth-order
inflation lag in both equations shows a coefficient that is statistically significantly different from zero,
higher lagged values were never statistically significant.
Second, the incremental explanatory power of lagged Treasury bill yields is relatively small after
we have controlled for lagged inflation.  Bill rates have somewhat greater explanatory power in the
postwar period than for the full sample period.  Because most of the estimated coefficients on bill rates
for both sample periods are statistically insignificant, however, we expect that the unexpected inflation
series calculated from specifications (5a) and (5b) should perform similarly in our tests for the correlation
between unexpected inflation and asset returns.
We estimate of unexpected inflation (pu,t) by computing the residuals from either (5a) or (5b).
(Strictly speaking, our estimates for each year use some future information, because the coefficients are
estimated over the full sample period.)  We then use the resulting time series of residuals as the
explanatory variables in regression models in which real stock, bond, or bill returns are the dependent
variables, as follows:
(6) rit = a + li*pu,t  + xit.
Table 8 shows the results of estimating these regression models.  It reports the coefficient values for li.
The results provide no evidence to suggest that stocks or bonds have been inflation hedges during the last23
seventy years.  For both of these asset categories, a one percentage point increase in the rate of
unexpected inflation is associated with a decline of more than one percent in bond and in stock values.
The estimated negative effects are larger, though somewhat less precisely estimated, for the 1947-1997
period than for the longer sample.  As noted above, the two unexpected inflation series, one
corresponding to a lagged-inflation-only predicting equation, the other corresponding to the augmented
specification with lagged Treasury bill returns as well, produce very similar results when they are
included on the right hand side of equation (6).
We also find evidence that unexpected inflation reduces real Treasury bill returns.  The effect on
these returns is more muted than that on bond and stock returns, and for both sample periods we find that
a one percentage point increase in unexpected inflation reduces the real return on Treasury bills by less
than one percentage point.  Nevertheless, for both sample periods we reject the null hypothesis that real
Treasury bill returns are unaffected by inflation surprises.
The finding that unexpected inflation covaries negatively with real asset returns is broadly
consistent with previous research.  For example, Barr and Campbell (1995) show that the real interest rate
on U.K. indexed bonds appears to covary negatively with inflation.  Evans (1998) surveys a number of
other empirical papers, using data from several nations and various methodologies, all of which reach
similar conclusions.  Our findings for equities are consistent with Bodie (1976), who suggested that using
equities to hedge inflation risk requires a short position in equities.
One question that some might raise about the results in Table 8 concerns our focus on one-year
return horizons.  It is possible that the high frequency covariation between unexpected inflation and asset
returns differs from the lower-frequency correlation.  Boudoukh and Richardson (1993) present some
evidence for both the U.S. and the U.K. suggesting that the nominal return on corporate equities may
move together with inflation at long horizons.   To explore this issue, we repeated our analysis using real
returns and inflation over five year intervals.  We confined our analysis to the 1926-1997 sample period,
and used an AR(2) model to construct an estimate of unexpected inflation.  We focused on non-
overlapping five year intervals, which provided twelve observations for estimating equation (6).  The24
results are show in the last row of Table 8.  They continue to show a negative correlation between real
stock and bond returns and unexpected inflation.  The only change relative to the previous findings is that
unexpected inflation no longer has a negative effect on real Treasury bill returns.
Our empirical results therefore suggest that the inflation-hedging properties of equities and long-
term bonds are limited.  Nevertheless, over long horizons, equities have typically generated very
substantial positive returns (Siegel, 1998).  Favorable long-term equity returns can be explained by high
real returns on equities, even if there is a negative high-frequency correlation between equity returns and
unexpected inflation.  A substantial body of research has tried to explain the high average return on
equities in the United States during the last century as a function of the correlation between equity returns
and various risk factors.  This proves difficult, and the resulting empirical puzzle has become known as
the “equity premium puzzle.”
The weak high-frequency correlation between equity returns and inflation is a challenge to many
traditional models of asset pricing, since equities represent claims on real assets that such hold their value
in real terms.  Prior studies offer explanations for the weak empirical correlation between inflation and
equity returns have been suggested, including the interaction of inflation and corporate tax rules
(Feldstein, 1980), and inflation illusion among equity investors (Modigliani and Cohn, 1979).  We are not
aware of any empirical evidence that provides clear guidance for choosing among these explanations.
4.  Evaluating the Utility Gains From Access to Real Annuities
Previous sections considered the operation of markets for inflation-indexed annuities and the role
of assets such as corporate stock in providing an inflation hedge for retirement investors.  We have not yet
considered how valuable inflation protection might be for a retiree seeking to annuitize his retirement
resources.  Hence, we next estimate a potential annuitant’s “willingness to pay” (WTP) for real annuities,
nominal annuities, and variable payout annuities with returns linked to common stock returns.  We focus
on equity-linked variable annuities because equities have historically earned higher expected returns than
other assets.   Our results in the last section showed that while bills offer some inflation protection, their25
expected return has historically been very small.  Bonds offer limited inflation protection and
substantially lower average returns, at least historically, than stocks.
The annuity valuation framework employed is closely related to that developed in Kotlikoff and
Spivak (1981) and MPWB (1999).  These two studies compared the utility gain that would accrue to an
individual who initially had no access to annuity markets if that individual were to become able to
purchase a nominal annuity.  Brown (1999) provides some empirical evidence suggesting that this
framework has some predictive value for explaining whether individuals plan to annuitize the balance
they accumulate in a defined contribution plan.  In this section, we compare the utility gains associated
with access to different types of annuities, thereby providing insight into the potential value to retirees of
real versus nominal annuities.
4.1  Analytical Framework For Evaluating “Annuity Wealth Equivalents”
Our basic algorithm estimates the utility gains accruing to someone with no annuity who is
offered a fixed, nominal annuity on actuarially fair terms, a real annuity on fair terms, and a variable
annuity backed by a portfolio of common stocks. To illustrate our procedure, we explain how we
calculate an individual’s willingness to pay for a fixed nominal annuity.  We assume that this individual
purchases such an annuity at age 65 and normalize age so that age 65 is “year zero.”  This individual
receives an annuity payment in each year that he remains alive, and his optimal consumption path will be
related to this payout.  The annuity payout at age a (Aa) depends on wealth at the beginning of retirement
(W0) and the annual annuity payout per dollar of premium payment (q):  Aa = q*W0.   In the case of a
fixed nominal annuity, the nominal value of Aa is independent of age.  For simplicity, we do not consider
the taxes paid on annuity payouts, or the taxes on the returns to non-annuity assets.  MPWB (1999) note
that findings with respect to the relative utility of different annuity schemes are not sensitive to the
inclusion of tax rules.
To find the actuarially fair ratio of nominal annuity payouts to premium cost, q,  for a 65-year old
male in 1995, we use the Social Security Administration's cohort life table for men born in 1930.  We26
define actuarial fairness as equality of the premium cost and the expected present discounted value of
annuity payouts.   This definition ignores the potentially important role of administrative expenses that are
incurred by the insurance company offering the annuity.  As such, it is likely to overstate the actual
payouts that would be available in an idealized annuity market.  We find q from the following equation:
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In this expression, Pj denotes the probability of a 65-year-old retiree remaining alive j years after
retirement, r denotes the annual real interest rate and p is the annual inflation rate.  We use years rather
than months in this part of our annuity valuation and continue to assume that no one survives beyond age
115, so P50 = 0.
After finding the actuarially-fair payout value, we compute the expected discounted value of
lifetime utility that would be associated with the consumption stream generated by this nominal annuity.
To do this we assume that individuals have additively-separable utility functions of the following form:
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For this functional form, the parameter b is the individual’s coefficient of relative risk aversion.  This
parameter also determines the degree of intertemporal substitution in consumption.  The nominal
consumption flow (Cj) is deflated by the price index, (1+p)
j.  
We consider a first case in which our 65-year-old uses all of his resources to purchase an annuity
contract, and a second case in which he purchases an annuity with half of his resources.  In the second
case, we assume that the other half of the individual’s resources are invested in a real annuity.  This case
can be thought of as describing the retiree’s choice problem when he has both an individual account
balance that can be annuitized, and also a substantial real retirement annuity like that offered by the
current Social Security system.27
We assume that the retiree has wealth at age 65 of W0.  In the case in which the retiree is
considering annuitizing all of this wealth, we first find the optimal consumption path for someone who
receives a nominal annuity of qW0 per period and who has no non-annuitized wealth at age 65.  For such
an individual, the budget constraint at each age a is given by:
(9) Wa+1 = (Wa + qW0  - Ca)*[(1 + r)(1 + p)].
The individual also faces an initial condition on wealth after purchasing the annuity: W0  = 0.  It is
possible that the retiree will save some of the payouts from the annuity contract, and thereby accumulate
wealth, in the early years of retirement.
Equation (9) assumes that the investment opportunity set for the retiree consists of a nominal
bond that offers a fixed real return r.  This specification assumes that nominal interest rates rise point-for-
point with inflation; our results in the last section call this assumption in to question.  The utility gains
from purchasing an annuity are likely to depend on the set of portfolio options that investors have outside
their annuity contract.  Campbell and Vicera (1998) present some evidence on the optimal structure of
portfolios at different points in the lifecycle for investors who have access to nominal and real bonds.
One natural avenue for further work is to link these two lines of research.
We estimate the value of annuitization by solving for the representative consumer’s optimal
consumption path {Ca} using stochastic dynamic programming, where the stochastic component of the
problem arises from uncertainty regarding date of death.  We then compute the value of the expected
utility function (U*) for this consumption stream, and label this as the utility value associated with a
nominal annuity contract.  To calculate the willingness to pay for access to a nominal annuity market, we
ask what amount of wealth at age 65 (WEQUIV) the individual would need to reach utility level U* if he
followed an optimal consumption path in the absence of a nominal annuity market.
The consumer’s problem in this case is to maximize the utility function (8) now subject to the
budget constraint and initial condition
(10a) Wa+1 = (Wa - Ca)*[(1 + r)(1 + p)]28
and
(10b)  W65 = WEQUIV.
The optimal consumption path in this case yields a value of the expected utility function U**(WEQUIV)
that depends on WEQUIV.  We use a numerical search algorithm to find the value of WEQUIV that yields
U**(WEQUIV) = U*, where U* is the utility level associated with initial wealth holdings W0. Since the
longevity insurance provided by the annuity market makes the individual better off, WEQUIV > W0.  The
consumer requires more wealth to achieve a given retirement utility level when he does not have access to
a nominal annuity market than when he does.
We summarize the willingness to pay calculation by computing a wealth equivalent measure
defined as W0/WEQUIV.  This is the ratio of the wealth required to achieve a given expected utility level
with access to an annuity market, to the wealth required without such access.  One minus this wealth
equivalent can be thought of as the fraction of wealth that an individual without any annuitized wealth
would be prepared to give up in order to purchase an actuarially fair nominal annuity.
The discussion generalizes immediately to the case of a real annuity or a variable-payout annuity.













This expression is analogous to (7), but the discount factor involves only real interest rates, and the
numerator involves only real payouts.  As in the discussion above, we find the optimal consumption
profile for a consumer who purchases such an annuity, and we then find the wealth equivalent from
access to a real annuity as opposed to no access.
We also consider the utility consequences of being able to purchase variable payout annuity
products, in particular the case in which annuity payouts are indexed to an underlying portfolio of
common stocks.  To compute the actuarially fair payout on such variable annuities, we assume that a risk-
neutral insurance company offers a variable annuity with an initial payout q” determined by29
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In this expression, R is the AIR for the variable annuity product, which we discussed above.  The payout
in the first period of the annuity purchase is therefore
(13)   Av(0) = q”*W0.
The nominal payout on the variable annuity is determined in subsequent periods by the recursion
(14) Av(t+1) =  Av(t)*(1+z)/(1+R)
where z denotes the nominal return on the equity portfolio.
In considering the equity-linked variable annuity, it is essential to recognize that the initial payout
on the annuity policy is increasing in the assumed AIR.  The appeal of the equity-linked variable annuity
arises from this higher initial payout stream, and from the higher average returns earned on the assets
invested in the variable annuity.
4.2  Calibration of Wealth Equivalent Calculations
To carry out the wealth equivalent calculations described in the previous sub-section, we must
calibrate the lifetime utility function, the survival probability distribution, and the distributions for
inflation and real returns on the assets that might be held in portfolios backing variable payout annuities.
Risk Aversion.  The parameter b in equation (8) represents the household’s degree of risk
aversion and its willingness to engage in intertemporal substitution in consumption.  This risk aversion
parameter is an important determinant of the gains from annuitization when the real value of annuity
payouts in future periods is uncertain because of stochastic asset returns or stochastic inflation.
Most empirical studies that attempt to estimate a value of relative risk aversion from household
consumption patterns find values close to unity, which corresponds to log utility (Laibson, Repetto, and
Tobacman, 1998).  Much higher levels of risk aversion are required, however, to rationalize the presence
of the large premium of corporate equity returns over riskless bond returns in historical U.S. data (Mehra
and Prescott, 1985).  It is difficult to reconcile the empirical evidence of low risk aversion and the
existence of the large historical equity premium.  Recent work based on survey questions about household30
tolerance of risk, reported in Barsky, et al. (1997), also suggests values higher than 1.  In light of this
dispersion of findings, we present calculations using risk aversion coefficients of 1, 2, 5 and 10.   In their
related study of the utility gains from annuitization, Baxter and King (1999) consider an even wider range
of risk aversion values, ranging from 2 to 25.  We are inclined to place the most emphasis on our findings
with risk aversion coefficients between 1 and 5, but we present findings using a value of ten to provide
some insight on how the findings would change with much higher risk aversion values.
Survival Probabilities.  The mortality process that we use in our analysis corresponds to the
population mortality table supplied by the Social Security Administration.  We use a cohort life table with
projected future mortality rates, since we are interested in an annuity purchased by someone who is
currently of retirement age. We use a 1930 birth cohort table to study a 65-year-old male, so our
calculations effectively describe someone who was considering purchasing an annuity in 1995.
The Inflation Process.  We use historical data from the period 1926-1995 to calibrate the
stochastic process for inflation. The average value of inflation over this period is 3.2 percent per year.
We assume that the inflation rate in each "year" takes one of five values: -1.5 percent, 1.7 percent, 3.6
percent, 9.0 percent, or 18.4 percent.  The respective probabilities of these inflation outcomes are assumed
to be .2, .3, .3, .188 and .012.  These inflation values correspond approximately to the 10th, 35th, 65th,
90th, and 99th percentiles of the annual inflation distribution for the years 1926-1995, and they imply an
average annual inflation rate of 3.2 percent.  We have devoted special attention the upper tail of the
inflation distribution to make sure that our analysis captures the possibility of a very high inflation period,
since we might otherwise understate the value of a real annuity.
We consider two cases for the inflation process, corresponding to different assumptions about the
degree of inflation persistence over time.  The first case treats each annual inflation rate as an independent
draw from our five-point distribution.  This approach to modeling inflation tends to understate the long-
run variance of the real value of fixed nominal payments, and thus serves as a lower bound on the impact
of inflation.   Our empirical findings in the last section demonstrate clearly that inflation is a highly
persistent process from year to year.31
In the second case, we allow for each inflation draw to persist for 10 years before another
inflation rate is drawn.  We use the same possible inflation rates and probabilities as in the case of annual
i.i.d. inflation shocks, but after drawing an inflation rate, we assume that it repeats ten times before we
draw another inflation rate.  This case probably overstates the actual degree of inflation persistence and it
should illustrate the value of inflation insurance in an economic environment that makes inflation a
greater risk to long-term welfare than it actually is.
The value of avoiding the risk of uncertain inflation is obtained by comparing our “wealth
equivalent” for access to an actuarially fair nominal annuity with that for an actuarially fair real annuity.
Our measure is related to, but not equivalent to, Bodie’s (1990) analysis of the value of inflation
insurance as the cost of purchasing a call option on the Consumer Price Index.  His approach generates
the cost of producing an inflation indexed income stream, while our approach focuses on the consumer
valuation of such an income stream.
Risky Asset Returns.  Our analysis assumes that investors have access to riskless real returns of
three percent per year (r = .03).  While this return is higher than the average return on “riskless” Treasury
bills over the 1926-1997 period, it is lower than current return on long-term TIPS.   We think of TIPS as
the riskless asset with respect to retirement saving, and therefore use a higher return than the historical
real return on T-bills. We further assume that inflation raises the nominal return on this riskless asset so
that the real return is unaffected by inflation.  This is tantamount to assuming that the investor is holding
an indexed real bond.
When we consider variable annuity products backed by portfolios of risky securities, we must
specify both the mean return associated with these securities and the variability of returns around this
mean.   Higher mean returns on the portfolios that back variable payout annuities will make these
products more attractive to potential annuitants, while greater risk will reduce their attractiveness.
We consider a variable payout annuity backed by a broad portfolio of common stocks.  Table 9
presents historical information on real returns and the standard deviation of real returns for U.S. stocks,
bills, and bonds over the 1926-1997 period.   This table is another way of presenting the information in32
Table 6 on real returns over different horizons.  We assume throughout that the standard deviation of real
returns on equities equals its historical average value of 20.9 percent per year.  As in our earlier analysis
of inflation, we use a discrete approximation to capture the distribution of real equity returns.  In this case
we use a four point distribution, with points corresponding to the 10th, 35th, 65th, and 90th percentiles of
the equity return distribution, to approximate the distribution of equity returns.  Real equity returns are
modeled as independent across time.  One drawback of this approach is that it does not capture the
possibility of extremely negative or positive equity returns in a given year, nor does it capture possible
serial correlation in returns over time, particularly any mean-reversion and resulting variance compression
at long horizons.
We consider two different assumptions with regard to the mean real return on equities.  First, we
assume a 6 percent real return (i.e., a 3 percent premium over the indexed bond return).  In this case, we
assume an AIR of 9 percent for the variable annuity, following the approach of Bodie and Pesando
(1983).  This assumption about the equity premium is substantially smaller than the historical average
differential between stock and bond returns, but it is designed to be conservative.  Second, we consider a
case with a 9 percent real return on equities, which translates to a 6 percent premium above the real bond.
This is still a smaller equity premium than historical returns suggest, but it yields a real return on equities
close to the historical average.  The extent to which historical real returns on corporate stock provide
guidance on prospective returns is an open issue (c.f. Campbell and Shiller, 1997, and Siegel, 1998).
4.3  Results on the Valuation of Real vs. Nominal Annuities
Table 10 reports our estimates of the wealth equivalents for real and nominal annuities.  The first
three columns report results for the case with no pre-annuitized wealth, when the potential annuitant
places all of his wealth in an annuity.  The second set of three columns explores what happens when the
potential annuitant already holds half of his net worth in a real annuity such as Social Security.  To
interpret the results, first consider the case in which the potential annuitant has a logarithmic utility
function (CRRA = 1).  In this case the wealth equivalent is 0.666 for a fixed real annuity, 0.684 for a
fixed nominal annuity in the presence of i.i.d. inflation, and 0.701 for a fixed nominal annuity in the33
presence of ten-year persistent inflation.  These results imply that an individual would be indifferent
between having $1 in non-annuitized wealth, having wealth of $0.666 that could be converted into a real
annuity stream, and having wealth of $0.684 or $0.701 that could be converted into a fixed nominal
annuity, depending on the inflation process.  If we subtract these wealth equivalent estimates from one
dollar, we obtain an estimate of the individual’s willingness to pay for access to annuitization.  A lower
wealth equivalent implies that the annuity is more valuable to the individual.
For a real annuity, the wealth equivalent is monotonically decreasing with the level of risk
aversion.  When the CRRA coefficient is 10, for example, the wealth equivalent falls to 0.499, meaning
that an individual is indifferent between $1 of non-annuitized wealth and $0.499 in wealth that can be
invested in a real annuity.  For fixed nominal annuities in the presence of uncertain inflation, this
monotonic relationship between the wealth equivalent and the level of risk aversion does not hold.  This is
because there are two effects of risk aversion that work on opposite directions.  The first is that higher risk
aversion leads one to value an annuitized payout more highly because the annuity eliminates the risk of
outliving one’s resources.  This is the only effect present when examining real annuity products.  The
second factor, which works in the opposite direction, is that more risk averse individuals have greater
dislike for the uncertainty introduced into the real annuity stream by stochastic inflation.  Increased
variability in the real value of the annuity flows reduced utility, and this effect is larger for those with the
highest degree of risk aversion.
At low levels of risk aversion, the first effect dominates, and the wealth equivalent is decreasing
with risk aversion.  For example, moving from CRRA=1 to CRRA=2, the wealth equivalent decreases
from 0.684 to 0.640 in the i.i.d. inflation case, and from 0.701 to 0.675 in the persistent inflation case.
However, as risk aversion increases further, the second effect becomes stronger, and the wealth
equivalents begin to rise as we increase risk aversion.
The wealth equivalents described above provide information on the amount that individuals
would pay to purchase annuities, assuming that they have no pre-existing annuity coverage.  The
difference between the wealth equivalent values for real and nominal annuities provides information on34
what a potential annuitant would pay to obtain a real rather than a nominal annuity.  For example, to
achieve a given utility target in a world with peristent inflation, a consumer with logarithmic utility
(CRRA=1) would require 3.5 percent more wealth (= .701 - .666) if he were only able to purchase a
nominal annuity than if he were able to purchase a real annuity.  At higher risk aversion levels the
additional wealth required if only nominal annuities are available rises even further. When CRRA=5 and
inflation persists, the potential annuitant requires 19 percent more wealth in the nominal annuity case than
in the real annuity case.
The results are attenuated when we consider the annuitization decision of an individual who
already holds a substantial amount of his wealth in a pre-existing real annuity.  Such a potential annuitant
would be prepared to give up a smaller fraction of his non-annuitized wealth to obtain annuity protection
for that wealth than would someone without a pre-existing annuity.  For example, a consumer with a risk
aversion coefficient of unity will give up only about 25 percent of his wealth to obtain a real annuity in
this case, compared with roughly 33 percent if he did not have a pre-existing real annuity.  The presence
of a pre-existing real annuity offers the potential annuitant some insurance against very low consumption
values.  This accounts for the diminished value of an additional privately-purchased annuity.
When the annuity option is a nominal annuity, rather than a real annuity, the effect of having a
pre-existing real annuity is more complex.  When inflation draws are independent across years, the results
are similar to those for real annuities: the willingness to pay for annuitization declines when there is a pre-
existing real annuity.  When we allow for a persistent inflation process, however, along with very high
values of risk aversion, the results change.  For example, when CRRA=5 or 10, the willingness to pay for
a nominal annuity is higher when the potential annuitant has pre-annuitized wealth than when he does not.
This is because we have assumed that the pre-existing annuity is a fixed real annuity, which provides
insurance against the annuitant ever experiencing very low values of real income and therefore
consumption.  Thus the utility cost of having high and persistent inflation erode the value of a nominal
annuity is reduced, and the potential annuitant’s willingness to purchase a nominal annuity rises.35
4.4  Results on the Valuation of Variable Annuities
Table 11 reports our findings for the case of equity-linked variable-payout annuities.  We assume
that the AIR for such annuities corresponds to the average real equity return that is built in to our
calculations. Once again we report two panels, corresponding to different degrees of pre-existing
annuitization.  The first column reports results when the average return on equities exceeds that on bonds
by 3 percent, so the real return to equities averages 6 percent.   For an individual with logarithmic utility
and in this return environment, an equity-linked variable payout annuity generates a higher utility level
than a real annuity.  The wealth equivalent for the variable annuity, 0.602, is lower than that for the real
annuity in Table 10 (0.666).
The lower panel of Table 11 reports the ratio of the wealth equivalent with an equity-linked
variable annuity to the wealth equivalent with a real annuity. When these entries are less than one, a
potential annuitant would require less wealth to attain a given utility level if he had access to an equity-
linked variable annuity than if he had access to a fixed real annuity.   The first entry in this panel, 0.903, is
the ratio of 0.602 (from Table 11, row one, column one) and 0.666 (Table 10, row one, column two).
The valuation of an equity-linked variable annuity is sensitive to the potential annuitant’s risk
aversion.  As the coefficient of relative risk aversion rises from 1 to 2 to 5, with an expected equity return
of 6 percent, the wealth equivalent of an equity-linked variable annuity rises from 0.602, to 0.632, to
0.846.  The same pattern is evident when we allow a higher real return on equities.  For three of the six
combinations of risk aversion and the real equity return that we considered, a potential annuitant who was
preparing to annuitize all of his wealth would prefer the variable to the real annuity.  For five of the six
combinations, this outcome also emerges in the case with a pre-existing real annuity.
These findings suggest that for plausible risk aversion and rate of return assumptions, potential
annuitants would prefer to purchase variable annuities with payouts linked to equity returns, rather than to
purchase real annuities offering constant purchasing power throughout the annuity period.  Even when the
expected real return on stocks is only three percent, the extra return afforded by the variable annuity more
than compensates potential annuitants for the inflation risk that they bear.  This is particularly evident36
when the annuitant is already endowed with a real annuity that represents a substantial share of net
wealth, because in that case the risk of very low consumption as a result of adverse variable annuity
returns is mitigated.  These results may be driven in part by our restriction of the menu of assets that
investors can hold outside the variable annuity.  In particular, we do not allow investments in corporate
stock except through the variable annuity channel.  We note below that analyzing the demand for variable
annuities in a more complete model of individual financial behavior is a key topic for further research.
5.  Conclusions and Further Directions
We have provided new evidence on the functioning of existing real annuity markets, and on the
potential role of nominal, real, and variable payout annuities in providing income security to retirees.
Three conclusions emerge from the analysis.
First, private insurers can and do offer real annuities to potential annuitants.  Although at present
there virtually no U.S. market for real annuity products, in the United Kingdom indexed government
bonds have been available for nearly two decades and there, indexed annuities are widely available.  From
the standpoint of an annuity purchaser, the cost of purchasing a real rather than a nominal annuity in the
United Kingdom is at most five percent of the annuity principal.
Second, real returns on a broad-based portfolio of U.S. stocks have historically outpaced inflation
by a substantial margin.  While extrapolating from historical returns must be done with caution, the past
returns suggest that there may be benefits for retirees from investing part of their annuity wealth in a
variable annuity product with returns linked to the returns on corporate stocks.  Nevertheless, our analysis
of the covariation between unexpected inflation and equity returns suggests that the appeal of an equity-
linked variable annuity is primarily the result of the equity premium, and not the result of a strong
positive correlation between inflation shocks and equity returns.  At least at high frequencies, U.S.
equities do not appear to offer a strong inflation hedge.
Third, we find that consumers would be prepared to pay a modest additional amount for the
opportunity to purchase a real rather than a nominal annuity. This conclusion flows from a stylized model37
of individual annuity demand for inflation-indexed annuites.  Consumers also value access to variable-
payout equity-linked annuities, although their demand for such products is quite sensitive to their degree
of risk aversion.  For moderately risk averse consumers, with coefficients of relative risk aversion of two
or less, willingness to pay for an equity-linked variable annuity may be greater than the willingness to pay
for a real annuity.  This finding obtains even when we assume that the average annual real return on
equities is only 300 basis points higher than the real return on riskless bonds.
These findings bear on two concerns that are raised in connection with Social Security reform
plans that include individual accounts.  One is that insurers might not be able bring to market products
providing inflation and longevity protection.  Our evidence suggests that this is, in fact, not a concern in
the two countries that we have examined.  Both have government-issued inflation-indexed bonds that can
be used to back the issuance of privately-sold inflation-indexed annuities.
A second concern is that, given a choice, retirees might use their individual account funds to
purchase nominal rather than inflation-indexed annuities. This is perceived as a problem to the extent that
it exposes retirees to the risk of consumption losses in old age. Our model suggests that the expected
utility losses associated with purchase of a nominal rather than a real annuity are modest.  It also implies
that consumer demand for inflation-linked annuities in an individual accounts system would be positive,
although the extent to which our stylized model describes actual consumer behavior is an open issue.  The
demand for real annuities is greatest among the most risk averse consumers.  It is also increasing in the
degree of persistence of inflation shocks.  When inflation is serially independent, willingness to pay for
the real annuity is lower than when inflation is highly persistent.  This is because, conditional on the
average inflation rate, the risk of experiencing high and persistent inflation poses a greater threat to real
retirement consumption than the risk of a shorter-lived period of high inflation.
The demand for real annuities also tends to be lower for households with a substantial
endowment of annuitized wealth.  This would include any remaining real defined benefit promises
offered to retirees under a restructured Social Security system. We estimate that the wealth equivalent of a
real annuity is about 5-8% less for the consumer holding half his wealth in Social Security, as compared38
to one having no real annuity at all. Older Americans currently hold close to half their retirement wealth
in real Social Security annuities (Moore and Mitchell 1998), which may explain why U.S. retirees appear
reticent to demand real annuity protection with the remainder of their wealth.
Our examination of the interplay between annuity choice, inflation protection, and portfolio risks
raises a number of issues that could productively be explored in future work.  One pertains to the use of
more complex annuity products than the ones considered here.  One type of annuity not considered in
detail here is the “graded nominal payout product” discussed by Biggs (1969) and King (1995).  While
graded policies do not offer inflation protection per se, they do provide annuitants with an opportunity to
back-load their real annuity payouts.  Willingness-to-pay for graded policies, relative to that for fixed
nominal or real annuities, would be straightforward to explore in our framework.
A more difficult issue for future research concerns the set of portfolio options available to the
individuals considering annuitization, and the extent to which such households have access to assets other
than riskless bonds.  One reason we find that investors would be willing to pay for equity-linked annuities
is that our models assume investors can access the equity market only by using variable annuities.  For
some low-income and low-net-worth households accumulating retirement resources in an individual
accounts system, it may be realistic to assume that they do not hold stock in any other way.  For higher
net worth households with greater financial sophistication, this assumption is less appropriate.  Extending
the current analysis to allow for a richer portfolio structure on the part of potential annuitants is an
important direction for further work.39
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Table 1:  Summary Statistics on Nominal and Real Annuities Available in the Compulsory Annuity
Market in the United Kingdom, 1998
Average Monthly Payout For a
£100,000 Annuity




Nominal Real Nominal Real
Man, 60 Years Old 666.20 476.35 4.26 6.09
Man, 65 Years Old 754.80 563.20 3.36 6.29
Man, 70 Years Old 872.94 679.50 2.88 6.31
Woman, 60 Years Old 602.99 416.81 5.34 5.02
Woman, 65 Years Old 666.88 482.70 4.27 4.49
Woman, 70 Years Old 760.50 575.06 3.65 4.48
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on data provided by U.K. annuity brokers.  Reference date
is August 21, 1998.  Sample consists of fourteen large insurance companies that provide annuites.  Data
were provided by Annuity Direct, Ltd.  All annuity products analyzed in this table offer a five year
guarantee period.
Table 2:  Expected Present Discounted Value of Annuity Payouts for Nominal and Real Annuities
Available in the Compulsory Annuity Market, United Kingdom, August 1998













Male, Aged 60 0.921 0.953 0.873 0.867 0.916 0.808
Male, Aged 65 0.908 0.936 0.868 0.854 0.898 0.797
Male, Aged 70 0.889 0.917 0.853 0.836 0.881 0.783
Female, Aged 60 0.928 0.966 0.861 0.876 0.924 0.832
Female, Aged 65 0.907 0.942 0.857 0.857 0.892 0.812
Female, Aged 70 0.886 0.920 0.841 0.836 0.869 0.790
Source:  Authors’ calculations as described in the text.  Sample consists of fourteen companies with data
provided by Annuity Direct, Ltd.   See notes to Table 1.44
Table 3:  Monthly Annuity Payouts on Single Premium Annuity Products Offered by ILONA in the










Age 65, Unindexed $7452 $6720 $6068
Age 65, Indexed 5149 4432 3849
Age 70, Unindexed 8520 7543 6663
Age 70, Indexed 6262 5332 4549
Age 75, Unindexed 10075 8825 7594
Age 75, Indexed 7833 6643 5552
Note:  All payouts correspond to an initial purchase of $1 million.   Data were provided by Irish Life of
North America (ILONA).   See text for further details.
Table 4:  Expected Present Discounted Value of Annuity Payouts, Freedom Inflation Indexed Annuities









Calculations Using Population Mortality Table
Nominal Annuity 0.864 0.830 0.889 0.887
Real Annuity 0.702 0.720 0.708 0.762
Calculations Using Annuitant Mortality Table
Nominal Annuity 0.987 0.984 0.966 0.967
Real Annuity 0.822 0.872 0.782 0.841
Notes:  Each entry shows the expected present discounted value of annuity payouts using the algorithm
described in the text.  See notes to Table 3.
Table 5:  Total Return, January 1 1998-December 31 1998, By TIAA-CREF Account
CREF Accounts:
 Inflation-Linked Bond Account 3.48
 Growth Account 32.89
 Stock Account 22.94
  Equity Index Account 24.12
  Social Choice Account 18.61
  Global Equities Account 18.58
  Bond Market 8.60
  Money Market 5.45
TIAA Accounts
   Traditional Annuity 6.71
   Real Estate Account 8.07
   Personal Annuity Stock Index Account 23.84
Source: www.tiaa-cref.org, various pages.45
Table 6: Real Value of a One Dollar Investment after Various Periods, 1926-1997 Average
Investment Portfolio Value After N
Years:
Cash (No Invest-

































Notes:  Each entry shows the mean value of a one dollar initial investment, in real terms, and the (standard
error) of this value.  Calculations are based on authors’ computations using actual realizations of inflation,
bill, bond, and stock returns over the 1926-1997 period, as reported in Ibbotson Associates (1998).



































































Adjusted R2 0.507 0.500 0.544 0.571
Source:  Authors’ calculations using data from Ibbotson Associates (1998).46
Table 8:  Unexpected Inflation and Real Asset Returns, United States, 1926-1997
                  1930-1997 Sample                 1947-1997 Sample Inflation Process




































Note:  Each entry corresponds to the coefficient li in the regression equation
Rit = a + li*pu,t  + eit
where Rit denotes the real return on asset I in period t and pu,t denotes the unexpected inflation rate.
Estimates are based on authors’ analysis of data in Ibbotson Associates (1998), as described in the text.
Table 9: Mean Real Returns, and Standard Deviations of Real Returns, 1926-1997









Treasury Bills 0.73% 4.17% 0.87 2.64
Long-Term
Treasury Bonds
2.57 10.53 2.01 11.13
Equities 9.66 20.46 9.93 16.95
Source:  Authors’ tabulations using data from Ibbotson Associates (1998).47
Table 10: Wealth Equivalents, Real and Nominal Annuities
Individual with No Pre-Existing Annuity
Wealth

























1 0.666 0.684 0.701 0.752 0.762 0.770
2 0.606 0.640 0.675 0.694 0.713 0.729
5 0.539 0.615 0.732 0.616 0.660 0.699
10 0.499 0.629 0.936 0.551 0.634 0.735
Source:  Authors’ calculations.  The wealth equivalent for the nominal annuity is calculated under the
assumption that inflation takes one of five possible values, roughly capturing the distribution of inflation
outcomes over the 1926-1997 period.  Inflation shocks are independent across periods in the i.i.d. case,
and persist for a full 10-year period in the persistent inflation case.  See text for further discussion.
Table 11: Wealth Equivalents, Equity-Linked Variable Annuity Products














                                                          Wealth Equivalent Value:
1 0.602 0.481 0.633 0.504
2 0.632 0.502 0.622 0.497
5 0.846 0.643 0.663 0.532
10 1.211 0.869 0.766 0.611
                                 Wealth Equivalent Ratio, Variable Annuity/Real Annuity
1 0.904 0.722 0.842 0.670
2 1.043 0.828 0.896 0.716
5 1.570 1.193 1.076 0.863
10 2.427 1.741 1.390 1.109
Source:  Authors’ calculations, as described in the text.  The calculations in the bottom panel show the
ratio of the wealth equivalent from the upper panel to the analogous wealth equivalent from holding a real
annuity with an assumed real return of 3 percent.  The underlying wealth equivalents for the real annuity
case are shown in Table 10, columns 1 and 4.